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Front & Center - RC Integration in CJTF-76--Template for Success
06/01/2005
June 2005
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By Maj. Michael L. Johnson
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The reserve component (RC)—Army National Guard and Reserve units—serving in Afghanistan under the Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76) are making tremendous contributions to the success of the multinational force. The current rotation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF 5) has roughly 17,000 American forces personnel; of that, more than 4,000 are Army National Guard and 3,000 are Army Reserve. These soldiers are conducting missions across the entire spectrum of the battlefield.
From infantry patrols, life support projects, human intelligence gathering, combat and air supply missions and base support, they have seamlessly integrated into the operational battle rhythm of the command. The Army has worked toward a total Army concept for years, and the current relationship between the Army National Guard, Army Reserve and the active Army in CJTF-76 (currently commanded by the 25th Infantry Division, Light) should serve as a template for future combat task organizations.
There are several reasons that this theater enjoys a successful integration of active component (AC) and RC forces. In CJTF-76, the Reserve and National Guard Affairs offices are collocated and operate as one consolidated entity. The relationship between the two senior advisors is extraordinary. This teamwork has resulted in a one-stop process for the command. When there is a reserve issue, regardless of component, the command knows where to go and has confidence that it will be worked thoroughly and quickly. When the Army Reserve and Army National Guard work as one team, it improves efficiency and makes it easier for the command to deal with RC issues.
Senior RC advisors are members of the commanding general’s special staff. This gives them exposure and access to the chief of staff and other members of the staff. This visibility is immeasurable in daily operations. On several occasions, issues have been identified and dealt with at the lowest levels because of the open communication between staff members and the reserve advisors.
The senior advisors are encouraged to take on additional duties. During this past rotation, both advisors were sworn in as deputy inspector generals, served as distinguished visitor escorts and as members of the process action team. These duties allowed full access to the theater and the ability to meet all the Army National Guard and Army Reserve units throughout the combined joint operational area (CJOA). While the advisors and their staffs were traveling throughout the CJOA, they were able to meet RC units and identify issues that might have otherwise been overlooked.
Providing the correct skill sets within the Reserve Affairs Office aided in its success. The RC filled the office with the correct personnel—a personnel, logistics and retention officer or noncommissioned officer brought the right skills into theater. The subject matter expert also had reach-back capability to either the National Guard Bureau or the U.S. Army Recruiting Command to quickly deal with issues surfacing within CJTF-76.
Leaders, both AC and RC, must continue to identify areas that can be improved so that this effort can be sustained in future operations.
While the current OEF rotation enjoyed a successful integration of forces, the Army should not be dependent on personalities or singular achievements. We must continue to develop policies that contribute to the continued synergy of all forces. It is inevitable that AC forces will continue to go to war or operate with a considerable RC presence.
Units must identify this early in their training plans. While modularity and the restructuring of the force should minimize the impact of deploying with RC forces, there are still several areas that are distinctly different. Active duty units should add reserve integration as a mission-essential task to their long-range training. This will ensure leaders have planned for the integration of RC forces before deployment.
The Department of the Army must continue to deploy organic command structure with RC forces. Within CJTF-76, there has been a distinct disparity in the number of personnel issues with units that came to theater without their organic leadership. In these cases, units were often split and deployed into various task forces throughout the CJOA. Lt. Col. James C. Boisselle, the CJTF-76 CJ-3, emphasized the importance of deploying units with their organic command. He believes “it is a small price to pay to ensure that soldiers have familiar leadership that can assist in pay, promotion and family care matters.”
Active duty units at all levels can begin to develop peacetime relationships with RC units. These relationships benefit all components and can be managed at the lowest levels. Much of this is ongoing. The 25th Infantry Division already had a solid relationship with the Hawaii National Guard 29th Infantry Division and conducted a warfighter exercise with them. Leaders must continue to reinforce the importance of these relationships and develop innovative ways to train, interact and share knowledge in a peacetime environment.
National Guard units must be fielded and equipped at a level that allows them to quickly mobilize and deploy with their active duty counterparts. No longer can the National Guard continue to rely on massive cross-leveling of equipment and personnel to properly outfit a unit. According to Harry Johnson, supply and services chief for the Army National Guard, the Guard has cross-leveled more than 41,000 pieces of equipment in support of the global war on terrorism. This process continues to decrease unit readiness rates and contributes to training deficiencies; in many cases, units are not fielded with critical equipment until late in the mobilization process.
This decreases the available training time and may decrease the unit’s proficiency in the early stages of a conflict. Long-term stay-behind equipment decisions must be aligned with modularity and equipment fielding.
Many National Guard units have left a considerable amount of equipment in theater; the Department of the Army must ensure that these units receive replacement equipment in a timely manner. Units cannot come home to an empty motor pool and be expected to continue training, conduct state missions and retain quality soldiers.
The National Guard deployed more than 140,000 soldiers in support of ongoing operations, and they also sourced and deployed new units, modified tables of equipment and in some cases equipped existing units for a completely new mission. With these ad hoc organizations, there are instances where pay, promotion and equipment problems have arisen in theater.
While RC units are under Title 10 authority and are the responsibility of the AC, individual states still can assist their soldiers by maintaining contact and assisting as necessary. Within this theater, we experienced successes with states helping to get soldiers promoted and sending critical equipment to their units. While we must keep in mind Department of Defense policies for Title 32 and Title 10, there are still many instances where state involvement is the best way to support National Guard soldiers.
RC forces are gaining combat experience and learning the newest and most innovative tactics and procedures. Each component must ensure they retain these soldiers. Both the National Guard and Army Reserve currently have a retention team in Afghanistan.
This proved extremely successful as they both reenlisted larger numbers of soldiers. Leaders must continue to work on reenlistment in theater and not rely on stop-loss as a retention tool. As the Guard is being deployed in large numbers for long periods, leaders must continue to structure reenlistment incentives to retain the qualified and professional force we are creating.
A major reason for the successful integration of AC and RC units in CJTF-76 was the Reserve Affairs Office. Both the Army Reserve and National Guard staffed the office with critical personnel from their headquarters. While this made operations in the continental United States more difficult, it was imperative to the success of CJTF-76. Direct coordination with incoming task forces will also help alleviate initial issues that may come up in deployments.
It is clear that tremendous strides have been made toward the total Army policy. RC units are deploying and conducting critical missions right beside AC soldiers. Boisselle said he does not even consider what component a unit is when he is planning missions, only the capabilities they have. The current operation tempo and prolonged conflicts will continue to provide opportunities for all three component to forge together into a single force. CJTF-76 has proven a successful formula for this endeavor. By studying their success and the efforts that the National Guard and Army Reserve headquarters have put forth, we can continue to duplicate this effort and work towards an integrated force that can deploy and conduct operations as a single entity.
MAJ. MICHAEL L. JOHNSON serves in the Logistics Division for the Army National Guard G-4 in Arlington, Va. He was deployed to Bagram, Afghanistan, as the logistics liaison between the 25th Infantry Division (Light) and the Army National Guard. |
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