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Letters
06/01/2005
June 2005
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ARMY RESERVE LEADERSHIP
In a March “Front & Center” article, Col. Jeffery Jacobs, USAR, critiques leadership in the Army Reserve. I agree with him completely that how we grow Army Reserve leaders and the leadership culture of the Army Reserve must change to meet the challenges of the 21st-century security threats facing our nation.
Clearly, Army Reserve leaders bear the responsibility to move the Army Reserve forward, and I can say with certainty that we are doing this. For the past three years, while serving at war, we have concurrently initiated the most profound change in the history of our 97-year old institution. We have refused to tolerate the old culture that Col. Jacobs describes and insisted that the Army Reserve be known as a learning organization that has the courage to change itself.
My intent as Chief, Army Reserve, is to use the energy and urgency of Army transformation and the operational demands of the global war on terrorism to change from a technically focused, force-in-reserve to a learning organization that provides trained and ready inactive-duty soldiers, poised and available for active service as if they knew the hour and day they would be called.
To that end we have taken bold steps to change how we grow leaders, starting with the implementation of an Army Reserve Leadership Campaign Plan in 2004. The plan established new ways to train leaders, including the Company Team Leader Development Course for company leadership teams (commander, first sergeant and unit assistor), Leader Development Guides for officers and NCOs with an emphasis on “leader” as opposed to “career,” a mentoring program to ensure mentorship of leaders, and a Senior Leader Training Program.
The senior leader program focuses on embedding the skills senior leaders need to implement change at the highest levels of the Army Reserve. This program has been conducted by every general-officer level command in the Army Reserve over the past two years, including the Army Reserve staff.
In addition to the innovations in the leadership campaign, we activated the new 84th Army Reserve Readiness Training Command (ARRTC) by integrating the 84th Division (Institutional Training) and the former Army Reserve Readiness Training Command; the integration itself is an example of leadership change. The 84th ARRTC hosts changed pre-command courses for all commanders—company through brigade/group. We have sharpened the focus of the Noncommissioned Officer Education System by consolidating oversight of our three NCO academies under the Schools Directorate of the ARRTC. The 84th ARRTC structure now includes a Leader Development Directorate with divisions responsible for leadership training and leadership initiatives.
We have forged new roads to enroll more Army Reserve officers into the Army’s institutional leader training programs. When the Army eliminated the Combined Arms Services Staff School (CAS3), the Army Reserve adopted and carried on this training in the form of the new 16-day Combined Arms Exercise (CAX). CAX belongs to the Army Reserve, and the professional development brigades in our institutional training divisions are teaching its five core learning objectives to captains and majors across the force.
Every eligible Army Reserve major is now required to graduate from the new Intermediate Leadership Education-Common Core Course as a prerequisite to attaining the rank of lieutenant colonel. We continue to push our officers into the Army’s most elite leadership institutions. This year alone, 25 Army Reserve officers attended the resident Army War College. We also placed three officers in the prestigious National Strategic Management Course at Syracuse University.
At the Army Reserve’s initiative, The Army Inspector General is conducting a special inspection of reserve component leader development processes in the institutional Army. This inspection is examining the many facets of how we grow leaders and will offer a solid baseline to change these processes to meet the needs of growing 21st-century leaders.
Finally, we have established firm standards for selecting who leads our soldiers. The leadership campaign introduced an Army Reserve combat leader validation program as well as systems for command climate assessments. Army Reserve training guidance is properly cited now for its emphasis on leadership, warrior tasks and true readiness.
We acknowledge the faults cited by Col. Jacobs. All should read my article “Profound Change While Fighting the War” in the October 2004 issue of the ARMY Green Book. It cites the initiatives under way to change the Army Reserve from the culture described by Col. Jacobs to the 21st-century culture outlined in my commander’s intent. Cultures are hard to change, but the process is under way across the Army Reserve.
All these measures are moving the Army Reserve towards exponential change. This kind of change will forever mark the Army Reserve as a highly professional, skill-rich inactive-duty force, serving the nation by providing trained and ready soldiers and units led by only our finest leaders. As Col. Jacobs alludes, a vastly improved leadership culture is the bedrock of success in this endeavor.
LT GEN JAMES R. HELMLY
Chief, Army Reserve, and Commanding General, U.S. Army Reserve Command
Washington, D.C.
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Although I appreciate Col. Jacobs’ limited observations on reserve component (RC) commanders he saw processing through a mobilization station, I was disappointed with the solution set offered to make better RC commanders. As an AGR officer currently serving in Iraq as a battalion commander, I would offer a different perspective and possible solutions to refocus the efforts of the RC commander.
First of all, I want to commend any RC officer who steps up to the plate and agrees to take command of a unit. Having now served as an Army Reserve commander, I have a full appreciation of the sacrifice they make to take these assignments.
We should commend their efforts instead of condemning them for the actions of a few “bad apples.” Having worked with both the active component (AC) and the RC, I have seen these bad apples in both components. The AC just has a more convenient method of removing the apple before it spoils the whole basket.
To take the events of the prison scandal and infer that all RC officers share this same lack of leadership is irresponsible.
We have many RC officers who have and will continue to perform admirably on the battlefield. And frankly speaking, I think the RC officer brings more to the table then their AC brethren.
Many come with civilian-acquired skills that offer both flexibility and creative solutions not found in their AC counterpart. This becomes more evident each day I spend in this deployment and see the work performed by our RC officers as they assist the Iraqi government in building the country’s infrastructure.
The point of Col. Jacob’s article was to address the lack of quality in RC commanders with the offered solution of replacing troop program unit (TPU) officers with active component or AGR officers who have served in AC commands. Putting an AC officer in command of an RC unit will only frustrate the selected officer and increase the chasm between the two components. The AC officer would spend the first year understanding the acronyms, processes and programs.
The AC officer would have to focus on getting soldiers DMOSQ (duty military occupational specialty qualified) whereas in the AC the soldier arrives with MOS (military occupational speciality) in-hand. The AC officer, who is used to sending a medically unfit soldier to the medical holding company for processing, would now have to learn the difference between an MMRB, MEB and PEB so the enormous amount of documentation can be prepared to designate the soldier medically fit or unfit.
The AC officer would have to understand the difference between an unsatisfactory participant and a nonparticipant in order to prepare the appropriate nine required “U” letters to begin the separation process as opposed to the much easier AC process of changing the soldier’s duty status from “duty” to “AWOL” on a single document. I offer these as just a few of the responsibilities faced by the RC commander.
The AC commander has more time to focus on mission accomplishment and work with his “100 soldiers every day” because they do not bear the administrative burden felt by the RC commander who has 100 soldiers two days a month and 14 days of annual training a year.
To suggest an AGR officer with AC command experience is going to do much better in the same situation is misguided. Placing an active duty officer (AC or AGR) in an RC unit as commander only affords the full-time staff access to the commander to process the plethora of administrative documents as manager of the unit, thus freeing the training weekend to focus on being a leader. And that is the heart of the issue. Removing the overwhelming administrative burden from the RC commander would afford the officer the time to develop a viable training plan and focus on preparing his unit for deployment as well as focusing on his own professional development.
The training, transient, holdee and student account is one program that will offer some relief but does not currently take the program to the level of establishing a holdee account for medical nondeployables. The Army Reserve could develop medical holding elements in the Regional Readiness Commands whose sole purpose is to process these soldiers initially deemed medically nondeployable and thus remove the administrative burden from the commander and the overworked, underpaid unit administrator (UA) military technician. The Army Reserve continues to turn a blind eye to the GS-rating for a UA under the guise of a limited civilian payroll. Upgrading this position would go a long way in attracting quality administrators who can be an asset to the RC commander.
The Army Reserve developed the ITRRS (individual training requirements resource system) to provide the commander with an automated tool to evaluate the overall administrative readiness of his unit. And although it is a great resource, it has replaced the unit status report as a means of evaluating the RC officer’s success or failure as a commander, so the RC commander tends to focus on unit strength and retention because that is how he is graded for success. Remove the administrative responsibility for maintaining unit strength and retention from RC commanders so they can focus efforts on ensuring a training environment for assigned soldiers.
Because of the geographical constraints of the Army Reserve, the RC officer will never be afforded the opportunity of sustained mentoring. The AC does do a better job at mentoring their company-grade officers because the battalion or brigade commander typically resides on the same installation. The RC officer may receive a periodic phone call from his senior commander or an annual staff visit, neither of which offers a mentoring experience. But this is not a new phenomenon nor can the problem be wished away by placing active duty officers in the same situation.
Col. Jacobs does offer one viable solution in recommending reimbursement for travel expenses outside the commuting area. In addition, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 authorized “responsibility pay” for RC officers and yet there is no guidance on how to receive the pay. These are just a few incentives that could assist in offering a much larger pool of available officers.
Replacing the TPU officer with an AC or an AGR with AC command experience does not change the culture of the Army Reserve. It certainly does not solve the problem because the AC or AGR officer will still be faced with the same administrative burden of managing the unit. It will also stifle the development of TPU officers, or is the intent to create good RC “staff” officers—not RC commanders? And I am not convinced an RC officer who has had AC experience makes a better leader.
Before the implementation of the Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act in 1996, AC officers twice nonselected for promotion to captain or major were afforded the opportunity to continue their service in the RC. Some of these officers are now lieutenant colonels and colonels in the Army Reserve. That may explain the caliber of some of the senior leaders Jacobs observed processing through the mobilization station.
In reference to the comments made in the article regarding the RC commander’s focus on the creature comforts of his soldiers at the mobilization station, perhaps this is still an issue because those same RC commanders are the ones left explaining to their soldiers why they must live in old World War II-era barracks while AC counterparts live in modern up-scale apartment-style housing units across the street.
They are left explaining why their soldiers must eat in the old, dilapidated mess halls with unrecognizable food products when two blocks away AC soldiers eat in state-of-the-art dining facilities that offer self-serve salad bars and distinguishable food items off-limits to mobilized reservists.
And finally, I would question the author’s reference to “observing” the behavior of the RC commander who had lost sight of the requirement to prepare his unit. At what point did the author take the senior leader aside and refocus his efforts on the preparation for deployment? It is easy to observe and evaluate; it is much harder to mentor and guide. One requires personal involvement.
In my 23 years of Army Reserve service, I have watched this component develop into a professional fighting force. Its burdens are enormous as it continues to support the global war on terrorism.
Yes, we can always find ways to improve the process, but RC commanders should be commended for their efforts, not dragged through a plethora of additional training programs or replaced by active duty officers for the irresponsible actions of a few officers.
LT COL CORRINA M. BOGGESS
Tikrit, Iraq
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Col. Jacobs makes some suggestions that are valid and could improve leadership at all levels of the Army (the seamless one). However, the cornerstones of his proposals are not valid. First he indicts the Army Reserve leadership because of Abu Ghraib and then he proposes that the active component has cornered the market on leadership at all levels and especially in units above battalion. These two suggestions do not follow basic logic.
For whatever reasons, Col. Jacobs ignores other incidents involving some of our soldiers, many of them active component. I certainly would not condemn the leaders of these soldiers the way Col. Jacobs condemns the Army Reserve leadership.
As to the quality of leadership, he infers that Army Reserve leaders at all levels sit around at home doing nothing while they wait to attend the next monthly meeting.
He fails to consider that many of these Army Reserve soldiers are leaders in their communities and occupy responsible positions in the public and private sector. Failing to consider this, he fails to give credit.
I believe that leadership is an innate quality that can be developed and improved. It does not make any difference under what circumstances the soldier came to wear the uniform. Of course the absence of leadership traits can be found in every rank, in every branch of service, active and reserve component.
Col. Jacobs proposes cross assignment of soldiers. I believe that would be a plus for all soldiers and the Army. He also suggests that having a battalion commander travel 500 miles to attend battle assemblies might improve strength and retention. That is doubtful. A reduction of the operational tempo of Army Reserve and National Guard units is about the only thing that will improve strength and retention.
COL CARMEN J. DIGIACOMO, AUS RET.
Pittsburgh, Pa. |
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